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Medicaid provides free or cheap health insurance to individuals with low in-
comes and has the potential to transform families’ spending patterns. According to
the 2014 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), 23 percent of households with at
least one person with Medicaid coverage have any quarterly medical spending, while
44 percent of households without Medicaid do. Meanwhile, only 38 percent of house-
holds with at least one person with Medicaid coverage have any quarterly health
insurance spending, whereas 73 percent without Medicaid do. These numbers are
consistent with Medicaid being a financial boon to households. But as Medicaid is a
means-tested program, these numbers could also reflect that poorer families that are
able to spend less on medical care and health insurance are more likely to be eligible
for Medicaid.
Despite a key goal of health insurance being to protect families from medical
expenditure risk, little is known about the effect of Medicaid on financial outcomes.
As Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard (2015) explain in their recent review of
economics research on Medicaid, “Given that a fundamental purpose of health insur-
ance is to protect individuals and families from the financial burden of large medical
expenditures, there is surprisingly little research on the effect of Medicaid on financial
outcomes.” The research on the financial effects of Medicaid that exists often focuses
on extreme spending events and finds that Medicaid reduces bankruptcies and the
number of bills going to collections (Finkelstein et al. 2012; Gross and Notowidigdo
2011; Hu et al. 2016). In contrast to the literature on the financial effects of Medicaid,
the literature that studies Medicaid coverage crowding out private coverage is large,
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but a key issue that has received little attention is what the financial implications of
this crowd-out are for families.1
The goals of this paper are to understand how Medicaid eligibility affects
families’ spending and to consider the welfare implications of spending effects. To
estimate the effect of Medicaid eligibility on families’ spending, I implement a sim-
ulated instrumental variables (IV) strategy using data from the CEX, which is a
data set collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) that tracks the expendi-
tures of U.S. households over the past quarter of the year. I focus on families with
incomes less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and use variation
in Medicaid eligibility due to legislative changes during the 2000s.2 During this time
period, several states changed their eligibility rules for children, but the majority of
changes come from states expanding Medicaid coverage for parents, meaning that
the bulk of the identifying variation comes from parents becoming eligible for Med-
icaid. The CEX provides two main advantages over many other data sets. First, it
allows for studying how Medicaid eligibility affects medical spending for a nationally
representative sample of the U.S. population. Second, the CEX allows for studying
how crowd-out affects families’ spending on health insurance.
I first consider the effect of Medicaid eligibility on health insurance coverage
using the CEX data. I estimate that an additional person in a family being eligible
1A sample of the literature, much of which I discuss later, includes Bronchetti (2014), Buch-
meuller et al. (2005), Busch and Duchovny (2005), Cutler and Gruber (1996), Gruber and Simon
(2008), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005a), Ham, Ozbeklik, and Shore-Sheppard (2014), Hamersma
and Kim (2013), Koch (2013), Koch (2015), LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004), and Shore-Sheppard
(2008).
2I use variation in both Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
eligibility. As is common in this literature, I refer to both Medicaid and CHIP as Medicaid for ease
of discourse, even though the two are distinct programs in many states.
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for Medicaid increases the number of people in the family with Medicaid coverage by
0.135 to 0.142 and decreases the number of private health insurance plans paid for by
families by an average of 0.053 to 0.055. These estimates are similar to estimates that
I find using the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) and fall within the range of other estimates of
the effect of Medicaid eligibility on health insurance coverage.
I then consider how Medicaid eligibility affects spending. I find that an ad-
ditional person being eligible for Medicaid reduces the likelihood that a family has
any spending on medical care in a quarter by 2.7 percentage points. The bulk of
this decrease appears to come from families who had relatively small quarterly med-
ical expenditures prior to Medicaid, as decreases in the likelihood of having positive
spending in a quarter that is less than $100 drive the results.
It is not immediately clear that the crowd-out of private health insurance
coverage will lead to families spending less on health insurance. According to the 2014
CEX, more than 25 percent of families with private health insurance do not have
any quarterly spending on health insurance, while only 30 percent spend more than
$1,000 per quarter on health insurance. A cottage industry has developed around
helping firms sign up Medicaid-eligible employees for Medicaid to save the firms
money (Kim 2016), and some research suggests that firms are successfully able to
capitalize on Medicaid expansions to lower their health insurance costs (Buchmeuller
et al. 2005). If the crowd-out comes from workers who had low spending on health
insurance, crowd-out may not result in cost savings to families.
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Taking advantage of the CEX’s questions about health insurance spending, I
find that an additional person being eligible for Medicaid reduces the likelihood that a
family has any health insurance expenditures by 4.3 percentage points. This decrease
appears to come from families that were spending more than $100 per quarter on
health insurance prior to Medicaid and reduces average spending on health insurance
in a quarter by $47. Under the assumption that Medicaid only affects health insurance
costs for those who experience crowd-out, the estimates imply that the reductions in
private insurance from Medicaid expansions save the switching families an average
of $4,124 to $4,284 per year, meaning the families that experience crowd-out were
paying significant amounts of the premiums for their private insurance. The results
from this study suggest that Medicaid eligibility makes families better off even when
crowd-out occurs.
The paper contributes to the small literature on the spending effects of Med-
icaid in a number of ways. One contribution is that the current study focuses on
Medicaid expansions that affect families, whereas other studies have mainly focused
on Medicaid coverage for childless adults, who comprise a much smaller share of the
Medicaid population. Another contribution of this study is that it uses a nationally
representative data set that is designed to measure expenditures and that allows for
considering the effect of Medicaid eligibility on a wider variety of financial outcomes
than previous research has considered. Importantly, the paper estimates the financial
impacts of crowd-out on health insurance spending. Whether families or employers
capture monetary savings from crowd-out is an open question that has important
welfare implications.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of
Medicaid and discusses previous research on crowd-out from Medicaid expansions
and on the spending effects of Medicaid. Section 2 discusses a simple conceptual
framework for how Medicaid eligibility could affect spending and what the implica-
tions of spending effects are for welfare. Section 3 describes the variation in Medicaid
eligibility, the CEX data, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
1 Background
1.1 Medicaid
Medicaid is a state-run program that is jointly financed by the federal govern-
ment and by states; it provides health insurance to people with low incomes, people
with disabilities, and the elderly in long-term care with low incomes.3 In 1997, State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) legislation expanded eligibility of chil-
dren for public health insurance beyond the existing limits of the Medicaid program.
In the years that followed, states have expanded eligibility for both the CHIP pro-
gram and Medicaid. States typically require family incomes to be lower for parents
to be eligible than they do for children to be eligible.
Although federal Medicaid rules require states to cover major services, in-
cluding physician and hospital care, the rules do not require states to pay for other
3Medicaid has traditionally provided coverage for low-income families with children rather than
all low-income adults. As part of the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid was expanded in many states
to include low-income childless adults. Some states had already expanded Medicaid to low-income
childless adults prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act.
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services such as prescription drugs or dental care. Despite flexibility in coverage op-
tions, most states cover most basic categories of health spending. For instance, all
states cover prescription drugs and optometrist services. While almost all cover den-
tal services for children, not all states cover dental care for adults. Covered services
are provided with little or no copayment required (Ross et al. 2009).
1.2 Prior Research on Crowd-Out from Medicaid Expansions
The health insurance effects of Medicaid eligibility are relevant for assess-
ing the magnitude and channels of any potential effects of Medicaid eligibility on
spending. In contrast to the literature on the financial impacts of Medicaid, a large
literature has examined Medicaid take-up and the effect of Medicaid on private health
insurance coverage. Much of this research builds on Cutler and Gruber (1996), who
estimate the effect of Medicaid eligibility on Medicaid take-up and on private health
insurance coverage using data from the 1988 to 1993 March CPS. To deal with the
endogeneity of Medicaid eligibility, they use a simulated IV strategy and find that
Medicaid eligibility increases Medicaid coverage by 23.5 percentage points and de-
creases private insurance coverage by 7.4 percentage points.
Since the seminal work by Cutler and Gruber (1996), other studies using
simulated IV strategies with March CPS data have tended to estimate effects of
Medicaid eligibility that are smaller in absolute value both on Medicaid take-up and
on the decrease in private coverage. For example, Shore-Sheppard (2008) finds that
adding controls for age over time causes the estimated effect of Medicaid eligibility on
7
Medicaid coverage to fall to between 15 and 19 percentage points and the estimated
effect on private coverage to be close to zero and statistically insignificant. LoSasso
and Buchmueller (2004) estimate that 9 percent of the newly eligible from the CHIP
expansions received coverage and that half of this increase came from those with
private coverage.
Papers that use simulated IV strategies with the SIPP find similarly mixed
estimates. For example, Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005a) estimate that Medicaid
eligibility increases take-up by 11.8 percentage points but does not affect private
coverage. Gruber and Simon (2008), on the other hand, estimate that an additional
person being eligible for Medicaid increases the number of people in a household
with Medicaid coverage by between 0.109 and 0.156 people and reduces the number
of people with private coverage by between 0.066 and 0.122. They find that most of
the decrease in private coverage comes from employer-sponsored coverage.
In addition to results varying by data set and specification, the effect of Medi-
caid eligibility on the crowd-out of private coverage differs by group and time period.
For instance, Hamersma and Kim (2013) use SIPP data from 1996 to 2007 and find
that a parent becoming eligible for Medicaid increases the likelihood that the parent
has Medicaid coverage by 14.8 percentage points and has no effect on private cov-
erage. Using CPS data from 1996 to 2002, Busch and Duchovny (2005) find similar
take-up rates and only weak, suggestive evidence that parental Medicaid expansions
crowd out private coverage. In contrast to these studies, McMorrow et al. (2016) use
National Health Interview Survey data from 1998 to 2010 and find evidence that
about one-third of people who take up parental Medicaid expansions previously had
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private coverage. Wagner (2015) finds that Medicaid eligibility expansions for the dis-
abled crowd out much private coverage, while early results for childless expansions
suggest that the degree of crowd-out may vary by state (Sommers, Kenney, and Ep-
stein 2014). As Gruber and Simon (2008) summarize, early results appear to differ
by data set and are often sensitive to specification, while the literature on the more
recent expansions tends to find more consistent crowd-out effects. Although there is
no consensus about the degree of crowd-out, the Congressional Budget Office con-
siders the crowd-out to lie between 25 and 50 percent (Congressional Budget Office
2007).4 Refer to Bitler and Zavodny (2014); Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard
(2015); and Gruber and Simon (2008) for excellent reviews of the literature.5
1.3 Prior Research on Financial Impacts of Medicaid
The literature on the financial impacts of Medicaid is smaller than the liter-
ature on crowd-out and has generally focused on an inability to pay medical bills.
Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) study the effect of Medicaid expansions in the 1990s
on bankruptcies. They find that a 10 percent increase in Medicaid eligibility reduces
personal bankruptcies by 8 percent. Finkelstein et al. (2012) study Oregon allocat-
4While most of the literature is agnostic about reasons that crowd-out might occur, two papers
explore endogenous health insurance offerings by firms. Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen
(2000) use firm-level data and find that a firm having more workers eligible for Medicaid is associated
with the firm being less likely to offer dependent coverage. However, they do not find that the share
of Medicaid-eligible workers in a firm has an effect on the premiums the workers have to pay.
Buchmeuller et al. (2005) find some evidence that firms whose workers are likely to have been
affected by Medicaid expansions raise employees’ contributions for family coverage. Neither paper
finds that firms are less likely to offer health insurance after Medicaid expansions.
5This literature review focuses largely on studies that use simulated IV strategies. Other papers
use different methods, including difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity designs. For
examples, refer to Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000); Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004); Dague
et al. (2011); De La Mata (2012); Koch (2013, 2015); and Yazici and Kaestner (2000).
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ing slots to an oversubscribed Medicaid program for adults using a lottery. Using
administrative data from the Consumer Credit Database and from the credit bureau
TransUnion, they find that Medicaid coverage is associated with a significant decline
in the likelihood that a medical bill is sent to collections but no significant decline
in bankruptcies or liens. Hu et al. (2016) study the effect of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) Medicaid expansion to childless adults using data from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York’s Consumer Credit Panel. They find that low-income zip codes
experienced a reduction in the number of unpaid bills and the amount of debt sent
to third-party collection agencies in states that expanded Medicaid.
Although these extreme financial outcomes are important, they do not repre-
sent a full picture of the spending effects of Medicaid. Contemporaneous spending
has received less attention, though the Finkelstein et al. (2012) Oregon study is an
exception. Finkelstein et al. supplement their analysis of administrative data with
survey data and find intent-to-treat estimates that suggest that winning the Medicaid
lottery decreases the likelihood of having any medical spending in the last six months
by 5.8 percentage points and of having an outstanding medical bill by 5.2 percentage
points. The current study differs from Finkelstein et al. in three main ways. First,
the current study focuses on Medicaid eligibility for families, while Finkelstein et al.
study the effect of Medicaid on childless adults, who may respond to Medicaid dif-
ferently than families. Medicaid eligibility for childless adults is still relatively new,
and the vast majority of people covered by Medicaid are in families with children.6
Second, the CEX contains a much wider set of spending outcomes than is available
6According to 2015 March CPS data, less than a quarter of Medicaid recipients had no children
in their household.
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in the survey used in Finkelstein et al. A particularly important spending outcome
available in the CEX that the Oregon health insurance experiment does not address
is health insurance spending. Third, the current study uses a simulated IV strategy,
while Finkelstein et al. study the effects of an experiment. While experiments are
often thought to be the gold standard of research, they are expensive and rarely
done with health insurance, which precludes them as an option for most studies of
Medicaid. As is the case with the Oregon health insurance experiment, they are also
often restricted in their geography.
Another study that considers the financial implications of Medicaid is Som-
mers and Oellerich (2013), who estimate the impact of Medicaid with the Census
Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Measure by stochastically drawing counterfactual
medical expenditures from propensity-score-matched individuals without Medicaid.
They find that Medicaid reduces out-of-pocket medical spending from $376 to $871
per beneficiary and decreases poverty rates by 1.0 percent among children, 2.2 per-
cent among disabled adults, and 0.7 percent among elderly individuals. My study
differs from Sommers and Oellerich in that I estimate the effect of Medicaid eligibility
using variation from natural experiments and consider a wider set of outcomes.7
7Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) produce an early study of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on
savings and consumption using CEX data from the 1980s and early 1990s and find evidence that
Medicaid eligibility increases non-health-related consumption and decreases savings. As Medicaid
typically had asset tests prior to the 1990s, their analysis pertains to a different vintage of the
Medicaid program than exists now. In Appendix B, I consider the effect of Medicaid eligibility on
non-health-related consumption and discuss Gruber and Yelowitz further.
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2 Conceptual Framework
Medicaid eligibility has the potential to affect health insurance coverage in
two main ways. First, it can allow uninsured people to become insured. Second, it
can allow people who were receiving private coverage to drop that coverage so that
they can receive Medicaid.
For the previously uninsured, Medicaid lowers the price of health care. As
health care is a normal good, this lower price means people should theoretically
consume more of it, a prediction that has found broad empirical support.8 If all
health care expenditures are covered by Medicaid, the effect of Medicaid on spending
on health care should be negative. If noncovered care complements covered care,
Medicaid eligibility could potentially increase spending on medical care. As lowering
the cost of medical care can increase the amount of medical services received, reduce
medical expenditures, and lower the risk of catastrophic medical bills, Medicaid likely
increases welfare for the previously uninsured.
For those who previously had private coverage, Medicaid may allow families
to spend less on health insurance premiums, especially if they were paying a high
share of the premiums for the private health insurance. However, if the coverage they
had was poor or if employers can successfully capture the cost savings from Medicaid
8However, it should be noted that people may ultimately consume less medical care if Medicaid
allows them to obtain more preventive care that prevents the need for more health care later.
Examples of research that find that Medicaid increases the use of health care services include Aizer
(2007); Baicker et al. (2013); Bronchetti (2014); Buchmeuller, Orzol, and Shore-Sheppard (2015);
Burns et al. (2014); Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008); Dafny and Gruber (2005); De la Mata (2012);
DeLeire et al. (2013); Finkelstein et al. (2012); Lipton and Decker (2015); and Taubman et al.
(2014). This finding holds for private health insurance (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2012, 2014),
Medicare (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2008, 2009), and health insurance expansions coming from
broad health insurance reform (Kolstad and Kowalski 2012; Miller 2012) as well.
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expansions, households’ spending on health insurance may not fall dramatically. If
the coverage people lose was poor, then Medicaid would affect medical spending in
a way similar to how it does for the previously uninsured.
The welfare implications of crowd-out depend on both the quality of the pri-
vate coverage that is crowded out and what share the family was paying for the
private coverage. Consider the following three pre-Medicaid-eligibility cases:
1. The family was paying very little for good coverage.
2. The family was paying full price for good coverage.
3. The family was paying very little for poor coverage.
Medicaid eligibility crowding out private coverage for case (1) does not necessarily
help the family. If an employer was paying large amounts for the worker’s health
insurance, then the worker leaving private employer-sponsored coverage for Medi-
caid lowers employers’ costs. These lower costs for employers may or may not later
translate into higher wages for the worker.9
Crowd-out of (2) or (3), on the other hand, will still make the family better off.
If the family was paying full price for good coverage (case 2), then Medicaid functions
9It is unclear whether workers or firms bear the cost of health insurance benefits. If workers value
money spent on health insurance as much as they would value the money itself, if employers can
perfectly identify which people are eligible for Medicaid, and if employers can perfectly and instantly
adjust compensation, theory predicts that employers will pass the costs of health insurance to
employees in the form of lower wages (Gruber 1994; Summers 1989). Therefore, Medicaid expansions
have the potential to increase wages if employers no longer have to provide workers with health
insurance coverage. However, these assumptions may not hold for a variety of reasons. For example,
identifying Medicaid-eligible people is likely difficult since employers would have to know total
family income. Furthermore, Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2015) find that the Oregon health
insurance experiment’s Medicaid recipients only value Medicaid at 20 to 40 percent of Medicaid’s
cost, suggesting that many low-income workers may not fully value health insurance.
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as an income transfer to low-income families. As Bitler and Zavodny (2014) explain,
these transfers are still welfare enhancing on average if societal preferences put more
weight on income at the bottom end of the income distribution than on income at
the top end of the income distribution. Under certain assumptions, risk aversion
results in crowd-out of (3) being more welfare improving than crowd-out of (2), but
in either case, Medicaid still makes these families better off. Refer to Appendix A for
a discussion of these assumptions and the model that underlies these predictions.
To summarize the empirical predictions and implications, Medicaid likely low-
ers medical expenditures, but there are also ways that Medicaid could increase medi-
cal expenditures. Medicaid crowding out private coverage would mean that Medicaid
eligibility should have a nonpositive effect on health insurance spending. Finding that
Medicaid eligibility reduces private health insurance coverage but not health insur-
ance spending means that the family’s private insurance likely had very low benefits
(and was therefore not costly) or that the cost-savings from Medicaid were passed
through to firms.10 Finding a negative effect of Medicaid eligibility on spending on
health insurance suggests that the family was paying the premiums for private in-
surance prior to switching to Medicaid.
10Alternatively, finding an effect of Medicaid eligibility on private health insurance coverage
but not on health insurance spending could also mean that firms distribute the cost savings from
Medicaid expansions to employees in other ways, such as through higher wages or better working
conditions. In the empirical section, I find that families experience a reduction in the amount that
they pay for health insurance, but I cannot rule out adjustments along other margins.
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3 Medicaid Variation, Data, and Estimation
3.1 Variation in Medicaid Eligibility
This paper uses variation in Medicaid eligibility that arises due to changes to
the income thresholds for parents and children.11 As most of the CHIP expansions for
children occurred in the late 1990s, the majority of the variation in this paper comes
from expansions for parents. In 2000, the mean income threshold for parental Medi-
caid eligibility for states in the CEX was 76.7 percent of the FPL. By 2014, the mean
income threshold was 100.7 percent of the FPL. From 2000 to 2014, 14 states more
than doubled their income thresholds. Many states, such as Arizona, Connecticut,
and Illinois, increased their threshold dramatically in the early to mid-2000s. Other
states, such as Arkansas and Kentucky, did not experience large increases until they
adopted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014. A third set of states, including Mis-
souri and Washington, lowered their eligibility requirements from 2000. Despite the
increases in parental Medicaid eligibility since 2000, all states limit coverage to par-
ents in families with incomes under 250 percent of the FPL, and all states except 3
limit coverage to parents in families with incomes under 200 percent of the FPL.
While most of the expansions for children occurred in the late 1990s, several
states changed their income thresholds for children during the time period studied.
For instance, Arkansas and Tennessee both lowered their income thresholds in the
early 2000s to under 200 percent of the FPL before they increased the thresholds a
few years later. Both Hawaii and Texas expanded CHIP in 2000, while other states
11Data on Medicaid’s income thresholds come from Hamersma and Kim (2013), the Kaiser
Family Foundation (2016a), and LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004).
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altered their eligibility thresholds in the mid-2000s. Table 1 shows the states with
the five largest increases and decreases to adult income thresholds during the time
period studied as well as the states with the five largest increases to the income
thresholds for younger and older children. For each of these states, Table 1 displays
the thresholds in 2000, 2013, and 2014.12
3.2 Data
The main data used in the analysis come from the 2000-2014 CEX Interview
Surveys. The CEX is a rotating panel that interviews roughly 5,000 consumer units
about their spending in the previous quarter every three months over five calendar
quarters. Every quarter, 20 percent of the sample is replaced by new consumer units;
these are not necessarily households but instead include household members who
share expenditures. I use the terms household and family to mean consumer unit.
I first use the CEX to estimate the effect of Medicaid eligibility on measures
of health insurance coverage. The CEX asks about the number of people in a family
covered by Medicaid as well as each plan that a family has. Unlike most other data
sets that ask about health insurance, the CEX also asks about spending on each
private plan. I focus on the number of family members covered by Medicaid and
on the number of various types of private health insurance plans that the family
spends money on in a quarter. I then study four main categories of quarterly health-
related spending: medical, prescription drugs, dental, and health insurance. Next,
12I display the thresholds in 2013 in Table 1 in addition to the thresholds at the end of the study
period because many states adjusted their adult eligibility in 2014 as they adopted the Medicaid
expansions of the ACA.
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I draw on the CEX’s limited information on medical debt to estimate the effect of
Medicaid eligibility on medical debt. In Appendix B, I use the CEX’s information
on labor market outcomes and other sources of income to consider possible effects
on nonhealth spending and on program participation.
As the focus of this study is on low-income families, I restrict the sample to
families who make less than 200 percent of the FPL. I choose 200 percent since most
Medicaid expansions for parents are no less than 200 percent of the FPL, but I evalu-
ate the sensitivity of the results to the cutoff in Section 4.3. For the primary analysis,
I use income data as reported by families but drop families with people who work
but have no income since they likely did not fully report income.13 I calculate all ex-
penditures in 2012 dollars and exclude families whose state identifiers are suppressed
in the CEX due to confidentiality reasons.14 The final sample contains 30,752 obser-
vations from 14,024 families. Summary statistics for the sample are shown in Table
2.15 As would be expected with a low-income sample, these households have lower
average education levels than the rest of the nation in addition to lower incomes.
Slightly more than one-third of the sample has someone who receives Medicaid.
13Prior to 2004, the CEX did not impute income, so families who declined to report income or
did not know their income show up in the microdata as having no income. Beginning in 2004, the
CEX began imputing the income of nonresponders. I use reported income data and drop families
with people who work but have no income to have the most consistent sample across time that is
possible. When the CEX begins imputing income in 2004, almost all families with earners report
positive income or the BLS imputes income for them. I consider the robustness of the results to a
variety of ways of handling income in Section 4.3.
14Families in the following states are not interviewed or their states are not identified for confiden-
tiality reasons: Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
15I do not show summary statistics for the ethnicity of Medicaid recipients because the CEX
does not begin asking about Hispanic status until 2003.
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Table 3 summarizes spending patterns for families with incomes less than 200
percent of the FPL as well as for families above 200 percent of the FPL. All of the
means are statistically different from each other at the 1 percent level except for the
mean percent of household spending on medical care.16
3.3 Estimation
The primary goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of an additional per-
son in a family becoming eligible for Medicaid on health insurance and spending
outcomes. I estimate models of the following form:
yifst = α + γfs + δft + βXifst + unempst + λELIGifst + εifst, (1)
where i indexes the family, f indexes the family type, s indexes the state, t indexes
the year, y is a measure of health insurance or spending, X is a set of individual
covariates, unemp is the state-year unemployment rate from the BLS’s Local Area
Unemployment Statistics, γ are state fixed effects, δ are year fixed effects, ELIG is
the number of people in the family eligible for Medicaid, and ε is the error term.
The X vector includes family income as a percent of the FPL, the square of family
income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head of the household being
male, indicators for the race of the head of the household, the age of the head of the
household, the number of working adults in the household, and the number of people
16Refer to Levy and DeLeire (2008) for a full consideration of spending patterns by income with
CEX data.
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in the household with high school degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’
degrees.
I impute ELIG using family structure, family income, the FPL, and the
state’s income eligibility rules. The λ coefficient is the effect of an additional family
member becoming eligible for Medicaid on the dependent variable. Because I focus
on family measures and the data are at the family level, this specification is slightly
different than much of the related literature that conducts analysis at the individual
level. This model is similar to Gruber and Simon (2008), who consider family-level
eligibility in addition to individual-level eligibility and argue that family-level analysis
is important since health insurance decisions are made at the family level. I define
family type using the number of parents, the number of school-aged children (aged
6–18), and the number of young children (under age 6) in a family. With this set-
up, a family with two parents and a young child, a family with two parents and a
teenager, and a family with one parent, one young child, and one teenager are all
different family types. This model accommodates the fact that multiple people in
a family can become eligible for Medicaid at the same time. For instance, all two-
parent families will have two people become eligible for Medicaid at the same time
if parental Medicaid is expanded, and the family’s ELIG increases by two.17
17Differential effects based on the number of people becoming eligible at the same time is po-
tentially an interesting source of heterogeneity. Unfortunately, results from analysis that examines
this heterogeneity are too imprecise to draw meaningful conclusions about differences. Another po-
tentially interesting source of heterogeneity is the effect of an additional parent becoming eligible
for Medicaid versus the effect of an additional child becoming eligible for Medicaid. However, there
is generally not enough variation in child Medicaid eligibility for precise estimates of the effect of
children separately.
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Estimating Equation (1) with OLS would yield biased estimates of λ because
Medicaid eligibility is endogenous as families with lower incomes are more likely to
be eligible for Medicaid. Since health insurance and health care are normal goods,
families with lower incomes will likely consume less of them and therefore spend
less on them. Estimating Equation (1) with OLS would falsely attribute this lower
ability to spend on health insurance and health care to cost savings from Medicaid
eligibility.
To overcome the endogeneity of Medicaid eligibility, I use a simulated IV
strategy to estimate the effect of an additional person in a family becoming eligible
for Medicaid. This approach was pioneered by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and involves
creating a measure that represents a state’s Medicaid generosity that is correlated
with Medicaid eligibility and that is correlated with the outcome of interest only
through its correlation with Medicaid eligibility. To compute the instrument, I apply
the income eligibility criteria in each state-year to the full sample for that year and
calculate the average number of people in each family type that would be eligible
under that state’s Medicaid rules. Conditional on family type, states with more
generous Medicaid eligibility rules will have a higher value of the instrument than
states with less generous Medicaid rules. Since I use the same sample to compute
each state’s instrument in a given year, variation in the instrument across states
comes solely from differences in Medicaid eligibility rules. I estimate Equation (1)
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) and use the simulated measure as an instrument
for ELIG. The instrument is highly correlated with the number of people in a family
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eligible for Medicaid. The first-stage coefficients on simulated eligibility are close to
1 (0.95–0.99 dependent on specification), and the F-statistics are over 1,000.
While the simulated IV approach provides a useful way to summarize compli-
cated variation in Medicaid eligibility rules, the exogeneity of the instrument relies
on the exogeneity of the Medicaid eligibility rules. If states that expand Medicaid
are changing differently from states that do not in unobservable ways, then the esti-
mates from the simulated IV strategy may be biased. For instance, if firms increase
employees’ share of premiums for spousal coverage over time, then states with more
two-parent households would see average health insurance spending increase. If states
with more two-parent households were also more likely to expand Medicaid eligibility,
then a failure to account for these unobserved trends would incorrectly attribute the
increase in health insurance spending from rising employee premiums to Medicaid
eligibility.
I take several steps to mitigate concerns about unobserved trends. First, I
allow each family type to have different state fixed effects (γ coefficients) and different
year fixed effects (δ coefficients). Thus, identification of λ comes from how an outcome
changes after a change to eligibility relative to the initial differences for that family
type in that state and relative to how outcomes change for that family type over
time. This approach addresses the criticism of early use of the simulated IV strategy
from Shore-Sheppard (2008), who shows that the implicit assumption that everyone
has the same year effect and that all people in a state have the same baseline state
effects can lead to biased estimates.
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Second, for each outcome, I estimate two specifications: one set with minimal
controls and another set with extensive controls. The rationale for this approach is
that many potential unobserved trends would likely be correlated with observable
characteristics like unemployment and income levels. For example, suppose that a
state increases Medicaid eligibility because one of its main industries experienced
increased competition from abroad, which led to many people losing their jobs and
health insurance over time. Since the important, unobserved trend occurs at the
state level, it would not be captured by the year fixed effects. While this trend
is unobservable to the researcher, it would likely be correlated with income and
unemployment, which means including income and unemployment rates as controls
would alter the estimates because they would be correlated with the error term.
However, if the instrument really is exogenous, including the controls described above
should not alter the estimates.
I return to the issues of unobserved trends and of policy endogeneity in Section
4.4 to consider other ways to address the possibility that unobserved trends confound
the simulated IV strategy.
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4 Results
4.1 The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance
Coverage
Estimates from the CEX
I begin by showing estimates of the effect of an additional family member
becoming eligible for Medicaid on various health insurance measures from the CEX.
Table 4 displays the results. Each cell under the 2SLS Estimates subheading is the
effect of an additional person becoming eligible for Medicaid from separate regressions
of Equation (1) estimated with 2SLS. In the first column of estimates, the regressions
control for year fully interacted with family type and for state fully interacted with
family type. In the second column of estimates, I supplement the regressions with
the various demographic and labor force controls discussed earlier.
The first row of Table 4 considers the effect of an additional person in a family
becoming eligible for Medicaid on the number of people in the family with Medicaid.
The estimated effect is 0.135 when only state-by-family-type and year-by-family-type
fixed effects are included. When demographic and labor market controls are included,
the estimate is 0.142.
The remainder of Table 4 considers changes in private health insurance cov-
erage. In row 2, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
family pays for any private health insurance. The share of families with expenditures
on private health insurance falls by 4.4 to 4.6 percentage points when an additional
person becomes eligible for Medicaid. In row 3, the dependent variable is the number
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of private health insurance plans paid for by the family. The results indicate that an
additional person in the family becoming eligible for Medicaid decreases the average
number of health insurance plans paid for by the family by 0.053 to 0.055. The bulk
of this decrease appears to come from a drop in the number of employer-sponsored
plans paid for by the family, which falls by 0.038 to 0.040. The estimated coeffi-
cients are statistically indistinguishable from zero when the dependent variable is
the number of privately purchased plans paid for by the family.
The last two rows of Table 4 consider the effect of an additional person be-
coming eligible for Medicaid on the number of special purpose health insurance plans
paid for by the family. Special purpose health insurance plans include dental, vision,
and prescription drug coverage. The results provide no evidence that Medicaid eli-
gibility affects the number of special purpose plans paid for by the family. The last
row of Table 4 focuses on dental coverage, which is the most common special purpose
plan, and shows no evidence that an additional person becoming eligible for Medicaid
affects the number of dental plans paid for by the family.
Estimates from the March CPS and SIPP
The most commonly used data sets to estimate health insurance changes from
Medicaid expansions are the March CPS and SIPP. To consider how estimates from
the CEX compare to estimates from the March CPS and the SIPP over this time
period and with the states available in the CEX, I next replicate the health insurance
analysis with both March CPS and SIPP data.
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For the March CPS analysis, I use data from the 2001–2015 March CPS. As
the March CPS asks about health insurance coverage in the previous year, these
data provide information on health insurance coverage from 2000 to 2014. I impute
eligibility based on the household’s income in the prior year and the state’s eligibility
rules in the prior year. Although it is a common data set for studying the health
insurance effects of Medicaid, the March CPS is not without problems. Partly because
people may not be able to remember their insurance from the previous year, as many
as 10 percent of Medicaid recipients in the previous year may not report that they
received Medicaid (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2013; Klerman et al. 2009;
Lewis, Ellwood, and Czajka 1998). This Medicaid undercount can bias estimates of
the effect of Medicaid eligibility on take-up toward zero. A related issue is that some
people report having had multiple sources of health insurance in the previous year.
I code people based on their responses, meaning that some people may be counted
as having had both private health insurance and Medicaid in the previous year.
For the SIPP analysis, I use data from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 waves of
the SIPP, which provide information from 2001 to 2013. The SIPP interviews people
every four months and asks about each month since the previous interview. As Chetty
(2008) finds that people report the same responses during one interview for all four
months associated with the interview period, I restrict the sample to observations
from the interview month.
I aggregate information in both data sets to the family level so that the three
analysis data sets have similar structures. This aggregation involves calculating the
number of people in each family with various sources of health insurance as well as
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the number of workers in the household and the number of people with high school
degrees, with some college, and with at least a bachelor’s degree. I also control for
the age, race, and gender of the head of the household. As with the CEX analysis,
I restrict the sample to families making less than 200 percent of the FPL in the
past year and to the 42 states that are publicly identifiable in the CEX. I create the
instruments as described earlier and then instrument for the number of people in the
household eligible for Medicaid using 2SLS.
Table 5 displays estimates of Equation (1) using these two data sets. Panel
A displays the March CPS results, while Panel B displays the SIPP results. The
estimates suggest that an additional person in a family becoming eligible for Medicaid
increases the average number of people in the family with Medicaid by 0.126 to 0.151.
The point estimates for the fall in private coverage range from 0.028 to 0.096. Only
one is statistically significant.
Although the evidence for a fall in overall private coverage is weak, the results
show a clear reshuffling of insurance. The point estimates for the change in employer-
sponsored coverage range from =0.095 to =0.053 and are statistically significant at at
least the 10 percent level in three specifications. This decrease appears to come from
both employer-sponsored health insurance as a dependent and as a policyholder.
Neither data set provides evidence that Medicaid eligibility affects the number of
people in the family with privately purchased health insurance.
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Comparison of Estimates
All three sets of estimates are generally consistent with each other and with the
previous literature. The point estimates of the increase in Medicaid coverage from an
additional person becoming eligible for Medicaid in the CEX fall within the bounds
of the estimates from the March CPS and SIPP, and none are statistically different
from each other. As these estimates are at the family level, they are comparable to
Gruber and Simon (2008). Their estimates of the effect of an additional person in
the family becoming eligible for Medicaid on the number of people with Medicaid
coverage range from 0.109 to 0.156, which encompass the estimates presented in this
paper.
The point estimates from my study for the fall in employer-sponsored insur-
ance from the March CPS and SIPP range from 0.053 to 0.096, while the point
estimates in Gruber and Simon (2008) range from 0.066 to 0.121. Although these
results for employer-sponsored health insurance are not directly comparable to the
CEX results since the CEX results are about plans that may cover multiple people,
they suggest similar patterns among the three data sets.
The results support the idea that there is more crowd-out from more recent
expansions for parents than from earlier expansions as suggested by the results of
Busch and Duchovny (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), and McMorrow et al.
(2016).18 One possible reason that crowd-out could be higher in more recent years is
18In results available upon request, I have redone the SIPP and CPS analysis focusing exclusively
on the parental expansions and using the same years of data as Busch and Duchovny (2005) and
Hamersma and Kim (2013) and find similar results, which suggests that the different time periods
and expansions are why we find different crowd-out results rather than differences in our approaches.
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that firms have pushed more of the cost of health insurance onto employees as health
insurance costs have risen (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016b). In short, the results
about the effect of Medicaid expansions on health insurance coverage found in the
CEX are largely corroborated by the March CPS and the SIPP and are generally
consistent with other studies.
4.2 The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Spending on Health
Insurance and Medical Care
I next consider the implications of these health insurance changes for house-
hold spending on medical care and on health insurance. Table 6 displays 2SLS es-
timates of the effect of an additional person becoming eligible for Medicaid from
Equation (1) on various spending outcomes. .
Row 1 displays estimates of the effect on medical spending variables. The
estimates imply that an additional person in a family becoming eligible for Medicaid
reduces the likelihood that a family has any medical spending by 2.7 percentage
points. Much of this decrease appears to come from families with positive quarterly
spending that is less than $100, which falls by about 2 percentage points. I do not find
evidence that Medicaid reduces the likelihood that families have medical spending
over $100 per quarter, nor do I find any evidence that Medicaid has impacts on
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average medical spending, though I should note that I cannot rule out meaningful
effects for either outcome.19
Row 2 of Table 6 considers the effect of an additional person becoming eli-
gible for Medicaid on prescription drug spending and displays some evidence that
Medicaid reduces the likelihood that families have positive but small expenditures
on prescription drugs. Row 3 considers the effect of Medicaid on dental spending.
I find no evidence that an additional family member being eligible for Medicaid af-
fects dental spending. This null result may arise with dental spending because dental
spending is more discretionary and families might not visit the dentist without dental
insurance.20
Row 4 of Table 6 considers how spending on health insurance changes as a
result of an additional person in a family becoming eligible for Medicaid. The esti-
mates suggest that the likelihood that families have any spending on health insurance
falls by 4.3 percentage points when an additional family member becomes eligible for
Medicaid. This decrease in the number of families with any health insurance spend-
ing does not appear to come from families that were spending small amounts on
health insurance coverage as the percentage of families with positive spending less
19Estimating the effect on average medical spending is complicated by medical spending’s severe
right skew. Likely for this reason, other research (e.g., Finkelstein et al. 2012) often does not consider
average effects and instead considers indicators for any medical spending or for any medical bills.
I have also considered other methods, such as estimating quantile IV regression models, but these
models do not converge, likely due to the large number of fixed effects. Therefore, I report the
estimated effects on average spending but focus the discussion on indicators for categories of medical
spending because of the issues with studying average medical spending.
20Although all states provide preventive dental coverage for children, many states only provide
emergency dental services for adults. When I restrict the sample to states that provide dental
coverage to adults during this time period (as defined in Decker and Lipton 2015), I still find no
evidence of an effect of an additional family member becoming eligible for Medicaid on dental
spending.
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than $100 does not change. Instead, all of the increase in families with no spending
appears to come from families that were spending over $100 per quarter. Average
per quarter spending on health insurance coverage falls by about $47.
Medicaid allowing families to spend less on private health insurance coverage
is important. A concern with Medicaid crowding out private coverage is that Medi-
caid could potentially not be helping low-income people as was originally intended.
Instead, Medicaid could mean employers have to pay less in fringe benefits. How-
ever, these results suggest that low-income families that were relying on employer-
sponsored coverage were doing so at a large cost.21 Since these estimates imply that
the coverage that was crowded was high quality, they also suggest that the reduced
medical spending likely comes from the previously uninsured.
Table 7 considers the effect of Medicaid eligibility on medical debt. Medicaid
has the potential to affect medical debt since families may not pay medical bills
immediately. The CEX only asks about debt in certain interviews, so the sample
sizes are much smaller, which results in noise in the estimates. I do not find strong
evidence that Medicaid eligibility affects the likelihood of having any debt. However,
it is important to note that I cannot rule out sizable impacts on many of the medical
debt outcomes.
21Note that the size of the estimates do not rule out that employers could have reduced health
insurance expenses because of crowd-out. Any reduced health insurance expenditures for firms
arising from crowd-out may be profit for firms or may be passed onto workers in a variety of ways.
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4.3 Robustness
I next verify the robustness of the key health insurance and spending results
to various data and estimation choices. Column 1 of Table 8 displays the original
estimates with state-by-family-type indicators, year-by-family-type indicators, and
demographic and labor market controls.22
The main results use reported income and drop families with people who
worked but had no income from the sample. I now consider the sensitivity of the
results to three alternatives. Column 2 of Table 8 displays results that no longer
drop families with workers but no income. Column 3 displays results that use imputed
income rather than reported income when imputed income is available beginning in
2004. Column 4 displays results that drop workers who had their incomes imputed
once the CEX began imputing data as well as families with workers but no incomes.
In all cases, the results are qualitatively similar and generally maintain statistical
significance.
For the main analysis, I generate the simulated measure of eligibility by ap-
plying the income eligibility criteria in each state-year to the CEX sample for that
year. I now consider two alternative methods of constructing the instrument. As
the March CPS income measure has advantages over the CEX measure, such as a
larger sample size and more comparability over time (BLS 2016), I next construct
the instrument and eligibility measure using March CPS data rather than CEX data.
Specifically, I use the March CPS to compute the average number of family members
22Although Tables 8 and 9 focus on select results for conciseness, the omitted results are quali-
tatively similar to the main results presented in the paper as well and are available from the author
upon request.
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eligible for Medicaid as well as the simulated instrument for each family type, year,
and state combination. I then merge these measures to the CEX on family type, year,
and state and replicate the CEX analysis using average eligibility and the simulated
instrument from the March CPS.23 The results are shown in Column 5 of Table 8.
Another alternative method of constructing the instrument is to apply the income
eligibility criteria in each state-year to the entire sample for all years.24 The results
are shown in column 6 of Table 8. With both alternative instrument definitions, the
results are similar to the original estimates.
The main analysis did not weight the estimation using the CEX weights,
which are designed to make the CEX representative of regions of the United States.
In column 7, I weight the regressions using the CEX weights. Again, the results are
similar regardless of whether or not weights are used.
The CEX contains multiple observations per family. In column 8, I consider
the robustness of the results to collapsing the data to one observation per family by
producing quarterly means of the outcomes. I use eligibility and characteristics in the
most recent interview, meaning eligibility and the controls are imperfectly measured.
Despite the measurement error, the results remain similar.
23This strategy follows Bronchetti (2014), who studies how the effect of Medicaid eligibility on
health care access differs for immigrants and natives using outcomes and demographic characteristics
from the National Health Interview Surveys but the instrument and eligibility measure from the
March CPS.
24Using a fixed sample each year to compute the instrument is valid since the year coefficients
control for national changes in income over time, but the results not being robust to using a fixed
sample across years would still be troubling. Examples of studies that use a fixed sample across
years include Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) and Shore-Sheppard (2008), while examples of studies
that use different samples for each year include Bronchetti (2014) and Gruber and Simon (2008)
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In the main analysis, I restricted the sample to families with incomes under
200 percent of the FPL because most of the Medicaid expansions during the 2000s
were for parents making under 200 percent of the FPL. Since the CEX does not
contain nearly as many observations as the CPS and SIPP, focusing narrowly on
the affected population makes the estimates more precise. Nevertheless, we would
be concerned if the results change drastically with slight sample alternations. In
column 9 of Table 8, I broaden the sample to include families under 250 percent of
the FPL. Although a few of the coefficients are no longer statistically significant at
conventional levels, the point estimates are similar and the results are qualitatively
the same.
An alternative to using a simulated IV strategy is to include the eligibility
threshold as an independent variable in OLS regressions. Instead of providing an
estimate of the effect of a marginal person becoming eligible for Medicaid, this ap-
proach provides an estimate of the effect of a change in the income threshold. As
Hamersma and Kim (2013) explain, the estimate of the effect of the income thresh-
old is appealing since the threshold is a major policy instrument that legislators can
control. Since most of the identifying variation comes from parental eligibility, I focus
on the effects of the parental eligibility threshold. The results are shown in column 9
and tell a story similar to the original estimates. An estimate with this approach can
be interpreted as the effect of increasing the eligibility threshold by 100 percentage
points. This approach implies that increasing the threshold by 100 percentage points
increases the number of people receiving Medicaid in an average family by 0.175 and
lowers the average number of private plans that a family has by 0.057.
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4.4 Revisiting Assumption of Parallel Trends
An important assumption of the analysis is that states that alter their Med-
icaid eligibility rules would have trended similarly to states that did not if not for
the changes to the eligibility rules. One way to relax this assumption that has often
been used in individual-level analysis has been to take advantage of the fact that
Medicaid expansions do not always apply to all ages. For instance, many CHIP ex-
pansions commonly set different eligibility rules for young children and older children.
Researchers can include state-year fixed effects and identify the effects of Medicaid
eligibility as to how outcomes of children at the affected ages change after Medicaid
expansions relative to how outcomes change for children at other ages within the
state. Studies of parental eligibility do not typically include state-year fixed effects,
presumably because the expansions do not vary by age for adults. With family-level
analysis, including state-year fixed effects is further complicated by the fact that
parents and children of all ages share a household budget, so an increase to parental
eligibility increases the value of the instrument for all observations in a state. In prin-
ciple, this study could take advantage of the fact that differences in family structure
mean that raising the parental eligibility threshold increases the number of people
eligible for Medicaid in a newly eligible two-parent household by two and the number
of people eligible for Medicaid in a newly eligible one-parent household by one. In
practice, there is not enough family-type variation within state-year cells in the CEX
to identify the effect of an additional person becoming eligible for Medicaid in this
way.
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To adapt the strategy to identify the effect of Medicaid eligibility using within-
state variation, I include wealthier families in the sample since they would presumably
not be directly affected by Medicaid expansions. Specifically, for each state, I calcu-
late the highest Medicaid threshold during the time period and include all families
with incomes above that amount in the sample. Since Medicaid expansions should
not affect wealthier families, I include the simulated eligibility measure as a control
and use the simulated eligibility measure interacted with an indicator for being in
the original, low-income sample as the instrument. I allow the state and year effects
to vary for low-income and high-income families. With this broadened sample, I can
now supplement Equation (1) with separate year-by-state fixed effects for each fam-
ily type, meaning that identification of the effect of an additional person becoming
eligible for Medicaid comes from how outcomes change for low-income families after
a state expands Medicaid relative to how they change for high-income families of
the same type in the state. This approach is similar in spirit to Hamersma and Kim
(2013), who perform a placebo test using a sample of high-income individuals.
The results are shown in column 1 of Table 9. Overall, the results are less
precise when identifying the effect on an additional person becoming eligible based
on within-state changes. The point estimate for the effect on Medicaid coverage is
smaller, but the estimate is statistically significantly different from zero and not
statistically different from the original estimate. Some of the other estimates are no
longer statistically significant from zero, but they are qualitatively similar to the
original estimates and never statistically different from them.
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The results from using the within-state control group do not provide evidence
against the main empirical strategy but are not precise enough to completely allay
concerns about unobserved trends. Another issue with this approach is that it can
only account for state-level trends that affect all families in a state. This strategy
would not account for trends that only low-income families experience. Given that
Medicaid is targeted at low-income people, it is not unreasonable to worry that
different trends in health insurance for low-income people may cause states to change
their Medicaid eligibility rules.
Another way to relax the parallel trends assumption is to supplement Equation
(1) with state-specific time trends for each state. If the estimates change dramatically,
we would be concerned that differential trends prior to changes in eligibility rules
drive the results. Estimates of Equation (1) supplemented with linear state-specific
time trends are shown in the second column of Table 9. The estimates are similar to
the original estimates, which is reassuring that state trends do not drive the results.
A more direct test of preexisting trends is to examine if and how the outcome
variables change immediately prior to changes in Medicaid eligibility. To do this,
I supplement Equation (1) with an indicator variable that is equal to one in the
year before a state changes its Medicaid thresholds. Significant coefficients on this
indicator variable would raise concerns about preexisting trends. The coefficients
on the indicator variable are shown in column 3 of Table 9 and are statistically
indistinguishable from zero in all cases. To restrict the focus to larger changes, I next
create an indicator equal to one in the year before eligibility increases by more than
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10 percentage points of the FPL. Again, I find no evidence of preexisting trends that
are not accounted for by the empirical strategy.
4.5 Local Average Treatment Effect Estimates and Estimated
Effects of Treatment on the Treated
The main analysis focuses on estimating the effect of an additional person in
a family being eligible for Medicaid rather than on the effect of an additional per-
son signing up for Medicaid coverage for two main reasons. First, Medicaid take-up
is endogenous. Sicker, more risk-averse, and more financially savvy families may be
more likely to take up Medicaid conditional on being eligible. Eligibility rules, on the
other hand, are decided by policy. The focus on the effect of eligibility means that
the main estimates are of the average intent-to-treat effect, which is a policy-relevant
parameter since policymakers can influence eligibility more easily than they can in-
fluence take-up. Second, it is possible that additional people receiving Medicaid may
have effects on the non-Medicaid population. For instance, if Medicaid expansions
crowd out private health insurance for sick people, then the Medicaid expansions
would lower health risks in the private market, which could lower private health in-
surance premiums. Alternatively, if Medicaid increases access to care, waiting times
for non-Medicaid patients may increase, which could lower spending on health care
by reducing access to the health care system. Medicaid expansions having broader
effects than just on those who sign up would bias estimates that assume Medicaid
only affects those who sign up for Medicaid.
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Despite the appeal of the intent-to-treat estimates, comparing intent-to-treat
estimates across studies can be difficult. To facilitate comparisons of my estimates
to other estimates and to provide an alternative way to assess the plausibility of the
estimates, I compute the average effect of the treatment on the treated, which is
equivalent to the local average treatment effect (LATE). As these estimates require
the critical assumption that Medicaid eligibility only impacts those who take up
Medicaid, which may be untenable, they should be taken with caution.
To calculate the LATE estimates, I replace ELIG in Equation (1) with the
number of people in a family receiving Medicaid and estimate the model using 2SLS.
As with the main analysis, the instrument is the simulated measure of eligibility.
Table 10 displays the LATE estimates for selected outcomes. The LATE estimates
imply that an additional person taking up Medicaid lowers the number of private
health insurance plans that a family pays for by 39 percent and decreases the likeli-
hood that a family has any medical spending in a quarter by 19.3 to 20.4 percentage
points. An additional person taking up Medicaid reduces the likelihood that a family
has any spending on health insurance by 30.6 to 31.8 percentage points and saves
families $333 to $347 per quarter on health insurance.
The LATE can also be formulated as the effect of switching from private
coverage to Medicaid for the health insurance spending variables. For this calculation,
I replace ELIG in Equation (1) with an indicator for whether or not the family pays
for any private coverage. These estimates require the even stronger assumption that
Medicaid eligibility affects health insurance spending only for families who experience
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crowd-out. The estimates suggest that Medicaid saves families who experience crowd-
out $1,031 to $1,071 on quarterly health insurance spending.25
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Medicaid has goals of expanding health care access and of reducing out-of-
pocket expenditure risk for low-income families. While many studies have explored
the effect of Medicaid on health care access, much less research has considered the
effects on household expenditures. In this paper, I use CEX data to examine how
Medicaid eligibility affects families’ health insurance coverage and spending patterns.
My estimates suggest that an additional family member being eligible for Med-
icaid reduces the likelihood that a family has any medical spending by 2.7 percentage
points. Although much of this decrease appears to come from families who had small
medical expenditures, I cannot rule out meaningful decreases in large expenditure
risks. These results are most comparable to Finkelstein et al. (2012), who study
the effect of the Oregon lottery on the likelihood that nonparents have any medical
spending. In their study, they calculate a LATE estimate for Medicaid coverage on
the likelihood of having any medical spending in the past six months of =0.200. The
estimates from this paper suggest a LATE estimate for an additional family member
having Medicaid coverage on the likelihood of having any medical spending in the
past three months of =0.204 to =0.193. Our estimates are not directly comparable
because my estimates describe quarterly spending for a family, while theirs describe
25These results are not shown in Table 10. The first estimate ($1,031) includes demographic and
labor market controls, while the second ($1,071) does not. They are statistically significant at the
1 percent level with standard errors of 290 and 294.
39
six-month spending for adults without children. However, despite the different sam-
ples and methodologies, the LATE estimates are similar, suggesting the results from
the Oregon health insurance experiment may generalize to the larger population.
This study is one of the first to consider the financial implications of the
crowd-out of private coverage. The analysis provides evidence that crowd-out occurs,
which is a common but not ubiquitous finding in this literature. An important and
unique finding from this paper is that crowd-out saves families money on health
insurance spending. Assuming that only families who switch from private coverage
experience reduced health insurance expenditures implies that these families save
$4,124–$4,284 on health insurance per year on average, which is similar to the average
family contribution for employer-sponsored health insurance coverage of $4,316 in
2012 (Claxton et al. 2012). This crowded-out insurance being high value suggests
that the medical spending effects are likely driven by the previously uninsured.
Some have suggested that crowd-out is a reason to limit Medicaid eligibil-
ity (Cannon 2005; U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee 2015). But the results
from this study highlight two important aspects about crowd-out arising from Med-
icaid and about the spending effects of Medicaid that policymakers should keep in
mind. First, even though crowd-out occurs, Medicaid expansions still appear to lower
medical spending for a sizable portion of recipients, suggesting that the previously
uninsured or underinsured experience welfare increases from Medicaid. Second, the
crowd-out from Medicaid allows families to spend less on health insurance. As low-
income families likely consume where the marginal utility of consumption is high,
this transfer can result in overall welfare improvements. In short, Medicaid realizes
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its intended effect of reducing medical expenditures for low-income families, but fo-
cusing solely on Medicaid’s effect on medical expenditures ignores a major part of
Medicaid’s contribution to low-income families’ financial health.
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Table 1: Largest Changes in
Medicaid Eligibility
State 2000 2013 2014
Panel A: Parents
Largest increases
Arkansas 19 16 138
Arizona 32 106 138
Nevada 32 84 138
Maryland 34 122 138
Illinois 35 139 138
Largest decreases
New Jersey 200 200 138
Washington 200 71 138
Maine 157 200 105
Wisconsin 185 200 100
Missouri 107 35 24
Panel B: Children Aged 1-5
Largest increases
Oregon 170 300 305
Illinois 185 200 318
Indiana 150 250 255
Louisiana 150 250 255
Hawaii 185 300 313
Panel C: Children Aged 6-18
Largest increases
Hawaii 100 300 313
Texas 100 200 206
Oregon 170 300 305
Louisiana 150 250 255
Wisconsin 185 300 306
SOURCE: Data on Medicaid’s
income thresholds come from
Hamersma and Kim (2013), Kaiser
Family Foundation (2016a), and
LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev.
Male head of household 0.340 0.474
Age of head of household 36.940 8.733
White head of household 0.723 0.447
Black head of household 0.207 0.405
Asian head of household 0.045 0.207
Two parents present 0.586 0.492
Number of high school graduates in family 1.115 0.898
Number in family with hs some college 0.618 0.792
Number of college graduates in family 0.190 0.501
Family income as a fraction of FPL 1.006 0.637
Anyone in family with Medicaid 0.355 0.479
Number of people in family receiving Medicaid 0.992 1.602
Any private health insurance plan 0.316 0.465
Number of private health insurance plans 0.374 0.614
NOTE: The data come from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. The sample
contains 30,752 observations from 14,024 families.
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Table 3: Quarterly Spending Patterns in the CEX
Incomes 200% of FPL or less Incomes over 200% of FPL
Mean % of Mean % of
Spending categories Means St. devs. spending Means St. devs. spending
Health insurance 223 536 1.8 544 749 2.7
Medical care 118 493 0.8 297 792 1.0
Prescription drugs 39 157 0.3 81 207 0.4
Dental care 40 238 0.3 118 419 0.5
Food 1,793 1,074 19.4 2,653 1,524 12.9
Clothes 349 514 3.4 630 1,142 2.6
Housing 3,603 2,659 35.5 6,801 5,011 30.5
Transportation 1,831 4,362 12.6 3,697 6,923 13.1
Entertainment 419 893 3.6 1,138 2,163 4.6
Retirement 172 679 1.3 578 2,456 2.1
Other 2,480 2,912 21.1 7,170 6,358 29.6
Total 11,069 8,813 23,708 16,127
NOTE: The data come from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. There are 30,752 observations with
family incomes at 200 percent or less of the FPL and 62,029 observations with incomes
above 200 percent of the FPL. All expenditures are in 2012 dollars. The mean family size
for families with incomes less than or equal to 200 percent of the FPL is 3.9, while the mean
family size for families with incomes greater than 200 percent of the FPL is 3.8. All of the
means are statistically different from each other at the 1percent level except for the mean
percent of household spending on medical care.
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Table 4: The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance
Coverage: Estimates from the CEX
Dependent variables Means 2SLS estimates
Number of people receiving Medicaid 0.992 0.135** 0.142***
(0.055) (0.050)
Any private health insurance plans 0.316 -0.044*** -0.046***
(0.014) (0.013)
Number of private health insurance plans 0.374 -0.053** -0.055***
(0.023) (0.020)
Number of employer-sponsored plans 0.300 -0.038** -0.040**
(0.018) (0.015)
Number of privately purchased plans 0.055 -0.012 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of non-employer-group plans 0.019 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Number of special purpose plans 0.049 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.009)
Number of private dental insurance plans 0.031 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Additional controls x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. The data come from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. The sample
contains 30,752 observations from 14,024 families. Each cell is the coefficient on
the number of people in a family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). All
regressions control for family-type-year and family-type-state fixed effects. The
second column of estimates also includes controls for family income as a percent
of the FPL, the square of family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator
for the head of the household being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of
the head of the household, the number of working adults in the family, the age
of the head of the household, the annual state unemployment rate, and the
number of family members with high school degrees, with some college, and
with bachelors’ degrees. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table 5: The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Coverage: Estimates from the March CPS
and SIPP
Panel A: March CPS Panel B: SIPP
Dependent variables Means 2SLS estimates Means 2SLS estimates
Number of people with Medicaid 1.62 0.126** 0.133*** 1.45 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.045) (0.042)
Number of people with private coverage 1.37 -0.028 -0.035 1.47 -0.096* -0.071
(0.036) (0.032) (0.055) (0.051)
Number of people with ESHI 1.03 -0.053 -0.060* 1.30 -0.095** -0.076*
(0.035) (0.030) (0.041) (0.040)
Number of people with ESHI through their own employers 0.34 -0.015* -0.018*** 0.46 -0.034*** -0.030**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of people with ESHI as dependents 0.70 -0.041 -0.046* 0.86 -0.068** -0.052
(0.029) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
Number of people with privately purchased coverage 0.17 0.004 0.005 0.17 -0.001 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024)
Additional controls x x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The data for the
estimation in Panel A come from the 2001 to 2015 March CPS. The sample contains 128,385 observations. The data for the
estimation in Panel B come from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP. The sample contains 77,388 observations from 18,949 families.
Each cell is the coefficient on the number of people in a family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). All regressions control
for family-type-year and family-type-state fixed effects. The second column of estimates also includes controls for family income
as a percent of the FPL, the square of family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head of the household being
male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head of the household, the number of working adults in the household, the age of
the head of the household, the annual state unemployment rate, and the number of family members with high school degrees,
with some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are shown in parentheses
below the estimates.
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Table 6: The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health-Related Spending
Spending positive but
Any spending less than $100 Spending at least $100 Average spending
Spending categories Means 2SLS estimates Means 2SLS estimates Means 2SLS estimates Means 2SLS estimates
Medical 0.312 -0.027** -0.027** 0.131 -0.020** -0.019** 0.181 -0.008 -0.008 118 11 11
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (9) (10)
Prescription 0.261 -0.018 -0.016 0.160 -0.019** -0.019** 0.101 0.001 0.002 39 -6 -5
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (6) (5)
Dental 0.099 -0.011 -0.011 0.031 0.000 -0.000 0.069 -0.012 -0.011 40 -2 -2
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (5) (5)
Health insurance 0.355 -0.043*** -0.043*** 0.038 -0.000 -0.000 0.317 -0.043*** -0.043*** 223 -47** -47***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (19) (17)
Additional controls x x x x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The data come from the 2000 to 2014
CEX. The sample contains 30,752 observations from 14,024 families. Each cell is the coefficient on the number of people in a family eligible for
Medicaid from Equation (1). All regressions control for family-type-year and family-type-state fixed effects. The second column of estimates
under each subheading also includes controls for family income as a percent of the FPL, the square of family income as a percent of the FPL,
an indicator for the head of the household being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head of the household, the number of working
adults in the family, the age of the head of the household, the annual state unemployment rate, and the number of family members with high
school degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are shown in parentheses
below the estimates.
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Table 7: The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Medical
Debt
Dependent variables Mean 2SLS estimates
Has medical debt 0.064 0.011 0.010
(0.014) (0.014)
Number of medical debts 0.072 0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.013)
Amount of medical debt 379 -119 -122
(425) (414)
Medical debt more than $100 0.057 0.015 0.014
(0.013) (0.012)
Medical debt more than $1,000 0.030 0.014 0.013
(0.011) (0.011)
Medical debt more than $10,000 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
Additional controls x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The data come
from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. The sample contains 6,049 fami-
lies/observations. Each cell is the coefficient on the number of
people in a family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). All
regressions control for family-type-year and family-type-state
fixed effects. The second column of estimates also includes con-
trols for family income as a percent of the FPL, the square of
family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head
of the household being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity
of the head of the household, the number of working adults in
the family, the age of the head of the household, the annual
state unemployment rate, and the number of family members
with high school degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’
degrees. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are
shown in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table 8: Robustness of Select CEX Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Keeping families Using Dropping Using Using fixed Using Collapsing to Broaden sample Income threshold
Original with workers imputed families with CPS for sample for CEX one observation to 250 as independent
estimates but no income income imputed incomes instrument instrument weights per family percent FPL variable
Number of people receiving Medicaid 0.142*** 0.169*** 0.137*** 0.165*** 0.146*** 0.169*** 0.155*** 0.138*** 0.159*** 0.175***
(0.050) (0.058) (0.048) (0.059) (0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045)
Number of private health insurance plans -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.050** -0.046*** -0.045** -0.056** -0.051* -0.038* -0.027 -0.057***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.016)
Any medical spending -0.027** -0.026* -0.023** -0.027** -0.017 -0.027** -0.031** -0.025 -0.025 -0.025*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Medical spending positive but less than $100 -0.019** -0.011 -0.020** -0.022** -0.016** -0.021** -0.016** -0.023* -0.011 -0.017
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Medical spending on at least $100 -0.008 -0.015 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.015 -0.002 -0.014 -0.009
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
Average medical spending 11 16 5 -1 17* 12 2 -4 4 6
(10) (16) (10) (10) (9) (10) (11) (14) (12) (11)
Any health insurance spending -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.031** -0.049***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)
Health insurance spending positive -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.003
but less than $100 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Health insurance spending on at least $100 -0.043*** -0.039** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.052***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009)
Average health insurance spending -47*** -41** -32*** -28** -41*** -50*** -52*** -51*** -38* -53***
(17) (19) (12) (11) (14) (17) (19) (18) (19) (17)
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The data come from the 2000-2014 CEX. In columns 1, 5, 6, 7, and 10 the sample contains
30,752 observations from 14,024 families. In column 2, the sample contains 41,509 observations from 18,448 families. In column 3, the sample contains 28,722 observations from 13,179 families.
In column 4, the sample contains 22,170 observations from 10,526 families. In column 8, the sample contains one observation for each of the 14,024 families in the main sample. In column 9,
the sample contains 38,322 observations from 16,904 families. Each cell in columns 1-9 is the coefficient on the number of people in a family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). Each cell
in column 10 is the coefficient on the parental Medicaid eligibility threshold as a fraction of the FPL. All regressions control for family-type-year fixed effects, family-type-state fixed effects,
family income as a percent of the FPL, the square of family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head of the household being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head
of the household, the number of working adults in the family, the age of the head of the household, the annual state unemployment rate, and the number of family members with high school
degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table 9: Considering the Possibility of Preexisting Trends
Including State-specific Year before Year before
within state time eligibility eligibility increase > 10
control group trends change percentage points
Number of people receiving Medicaid 0.101** 0.091* 0.013 -0.016
(0.041) (0.052) (0.021) (0.028)
Number of private health insurance plans -0.065 -0.062*** 0.004 0.014
(0.039) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015)
Any medical spending -0.010 -0.028** 0.007 -0.018
(0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Medical spending positive but less than $100 -0.015 -0.023** -0.001 -0.009
(0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Medical spending on at least $100 0.005 -0.005 0.008 -0.009
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Average medical spending 1 12 10 -5
(25) (11) (11) (13)
Any health insurance spending -0.035* -0.039*** 0.006 0.006
(0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
Health insurance spending positive but less than $100 0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.004
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Health insurance spending on at least $100 -0.042* -0.036*** 0.006 0.010
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Average health insurance spending -66** -45*** 11 1
(31) (16) (11) (14)
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The data come from the
2000 to 2014 CEX. In column 1, the sample contains 75,549 observations from 29,875 families. In columns 2, 3, and 4, the sample
contains 30,752 observations from 14,024 families. Each cell in columns 1 and 2 is the coefficient on the number of people in a
family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). Each cell in column 3 is the coefficient on an indicator variable equal to one the year
before Medicaid eligibility increases. Each cell in column 4 is the coefficient on an indicator variable equal to one the year before
Medicaid eligibility changes by more than 10 percentage points. All regressions in columns 2, 3 and 4 control for family-type-year
fixed effects, family-type-state fixed effects, family income as a percent of the FPL, the square of family income as a percent of
the FPL, an indicator for the head of the household being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head of the household, the
number of working adults in the family, the age of the head of the household, the annual state unemployment rate, and the number of
family members with high school degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. All regressions in column 1 include family-
type-income-group-year, family-type-income-group-state, and family-type-year-state fixed effects rather than family-type-year and
family-type-state fixed effects, while all regressions in column 2 also control for state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table 10: LATE Estimates of the Effect of Medicaid
Number of private health insurance plans -0.394** -0.387**
(0.184) (0.160)
Any medical spending -0.204* -0.193**
(0.105) (0.090)
Medical spending positive but less than $100 -0.146 -0.136*
(0.088) (0.079)
Medical spending of at least $100 -0.058 -0.058
(0.068) (0.064)
Average medical spending 79 75
(81) (79)
Any health insurance spending -0.318** -0.306***
(0.127) (0.113)
Health insurance spending positive but less than $100 -0.000 -0.002
(0.033) (0.032)
Health insurance spending of at least $100 -0.318** -0.304**
(0.128) (0.113)
Average health insurance spending -347** -333**
(145) (134)
Additional controls x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. The data come from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. The sample
contains 30,752 observations from 14,024 families. Each cell is the LATE effect of
an additional person in the family enrolling in Medicaid. All regressions control
for family-type-year and family-type-state fixed effects. The second column of esti-
mates also includes controls for family income as a percent of the FPL, the square
of family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head of the house-
hold being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head of the household, the
number of working adults in the family, the age of the head of the household, the
annual state unemployment rate, and the number of family members with high
school degrees, with some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
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Appendices
A The Model for the Conceptual Framework
In this appendix, I provide a fuller discussion of the welfare implications for
the family from crowd-out. As described in Section 2, the welfare implications of
crowd-out that arises from Medicaid expansions depend on the quality of private
coverage that is crowded out and the share the family was paying for the private
coverage. The following simple framework illustrates the possible welfare changes
that may be associated with crowd-out.
Suppose that a family has utility u(c) that is an increasing function of non-
health consumption c. The family’s spending must satisfy the budget constraint
c = y−m−P , where y is income, m is out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and P is
the premium spent on private health insurance. Both P and y are known in advance,
while m is a random variable with probability density function f(m) and support






If the family purchases private insurance, its utility equals
u(y − δP ),
where δ ∈ [0,1] is the family’s portion of the premium.27
This simple framework allows for describing the utility available to the family
in each of the three pre-Medicaid eligibility cases from Section 2. For simplicity, I
26This simple set up draws on Finkelstein and McKnight (2008), who consider the welfare effects
of Medicare.
27The determinants of δ are beyond the scope of this paper. As described in Section 2, if workers
value money spent on health insurance as much as they would value the money itself, if employers
can perfectly identify which people are eligible for Medicaid, and if employers can perfectly and
instantly adjust compensation, theory predicts that employers will pass the costs of health insur-
ance to employees in the form of lower wages (Gruber 1994; Summers 1989). Therefore, Medicaid
expansions have the potential to increase wages if employers no longer have to provide workers
with health insurance coverage. However, these assumptions may not hold for a variety of reasons.
For example, identifying Medicaid-eligible people is likely difficult since employers would have to
know total family income. Furthermore, Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2015) find that the
Oregon health insurance experiment’s Medicaid recipients only value Medicaid at 20 to 40 percent
of Medicaid’s cost, suggesting that many low-income workers may not fully value health insurance.
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assume the price and coverage for poor health insurance are approximately zero,
meaning that the family would essentially be uninsured even though it shows up in
survey data sets as having private insurance. The utility for each original case from
Section 2 can be summarized as follows:
1. The family was paying very little for good coverage (δ=0): u(y)
2. The family was paying full price for good coverage (δ=1): u(y − P )





Assuming that Medicaid covers all expenditure risks, then the family’s utility
is u(y) with Medicaid. Therefore, the utility gains from switching to Medicaid are
1. The family was paying very little for good coverage: u(y)− u(y) = 0
2. The family was paying full price for good coverage: u(y)− u(y − P )








u(y−m)f(m)dm are positive. Thus, the crowd-out of (2) and (3) make
the family better off, while crowd-out of (1) does not.
The availability of actuarially fair insurance and the family having a concave
utility function mean that u(y) −
∫ m
0
u(y − m)f(m)dm > u(y) − u(y − P ), which
would imply that crowd-out of (3) is more welfare improving than the crowd-out of
(2). Of course, these assumptions would also imply that low-income families always
purchase insurance, which is clearly not the case. Families likely do not purchase
health insurance because insurance is not actuarially fair in reality, especially since
some low-income families may not pay emergency room medical bills, meaning they
do not bear all of the costs of their negative health shocks if they are uninsured.
The empirical result of Medicaid eligibility causing both private coverage and health
insurance spending to fall would imply that crowd-out of (2) has occurred. The em-
pirical result of Medicaid eligibility causing private coverage but not health insurance
spending to decrease, means crowd-out of (1) or (3) occurred.
Another point to note is that concavity means that u(y)−u(y−P ) > u(y′)−






u(y′−m)f(m)dm for y′ > y.
In other words, the less income a family has, the more welfare improving crowd-out
of (2) or (3) is for the family.
60
B The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Nonhealth
spending, Participation in Other Programs, and
Labor Market Outcomes
The main manuscript focused on exploring the first-order effects of Medicaid
on household spending, but Medicaid has the potential to affect household budgets
in a variety of ways. I now consider second-order effects of Medicaid eligibility on
household budgets.
Through cost savings on medical care and health insurance, Medicaid eligi-
bility has the potential to lower total expenditures or to increase non-health-related
spending. As improved medical care access can lead to conversations with doctors
that lead families to consume less tobacco or alcohol and because smoking cessation
programs are part of Medicaid in many states, Medicaid can also influence spending
on categories that have health-related consequences.
Panel A of Table B.1 displays estimates of the effect of an additional person
being eligible for Medicaid on various types of expenditures and shows no evidence
that Medicaid eligibility affects other forms of spending. These results could indicate
that Medicaid eligibility has no impact on other forms of spending, but they may
also reflect that effects on other forms of spending are too subtle to detect with these
data and with this identification strategy.
These results differ from Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), who find a positive
effect of Medicaid eligibility on non-medical consumption using 1983 to 1993 data.
The fact that I do not find evidence of large consumption changes could occur because
of a lack of power. However, it could also reflect the fact that Medicaid programs no
longer have asset tests, which Gruber and Yelowitz find interact with eligibility to
make the effect of eligibility on consumption even larger.
Medicaid eligibility has the potential to affect labor market outcomes and
program participation in a variety of ways. For example, the income ceiling for Med-
icaid eligibility may discourage employment and earnings so families can maintain
eligibility. The insurance coverage from Medicaid may lessen the advantages of en-
tering into the labor market for employer-sponsored coverage. On the other hand,
Medicaid improving health could increase labor force participation or productivity.
Furthermore, any changes in earnings could affect eligibility for other means-tested
programs, while participation in Medicaid may increase awareness of other programs.
Panel B of Table B.1 considers the effects of an additional person being eligible
for Medicaid on the likelihood that families participate in other social programs, while
Panel C considers the impact on the number of earners and on family income as a
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percent of the FPL. I find no evidence that Medicaid eligibility affects receipt of
benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Insurance,
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, food stamps, or welfare.
Similarly, I find no evidence of effects on earnings or family income as a percent of
the FPL.28
28Other research typically finds no effect of family-level Medicaid expansions on labor force par-
ticipation (e.g., Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005b; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001), though there are
exceptions (e.g., Dave et al. 2015; Yelowitz 1995). Hamersma and Kim (2009) find that Medicaid eli-
gibility results in unmarried mothers being more likely to change jobs. Burns and Dague (2016) find
that Medicaid eligibility for childless adults lowers the likelihood that adults receive Supplemental
Security Income.
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Table B.1: The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Non-
health Spending, Participation in Other Programs, and
Labor Market Outcomes
Dependent variables Means 2SLS estimates
Panel A: Other Spending
Spending on food 1,793 -16 -20
(25) (27)
Spending on clothes 349 17 14
(13) (14)
Spending on housing 3,603 82 57
(68) (87)
Spending on transportation 1,831 -107 -115
(118) (109)
Spending on entertainment 419 13 7
(23) (24)
Spending on education 156 11 12
(33) (31)
Contributions to retirement 172 -2 -4
(23) (26)
Spending on cigarettes 88 -6 -6
(11) (12)
Spending on alcohol 41 0 -1
(4) (4)
Total spending 11,069 7 -57
(282) (298)
Panel B: Other Social Programs
Receives SSDI 0.057 -0.005 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
Receives SSI 0.058 -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Receives unemployment 0.056 -0.010 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010)
Receives workers’ compensation 0.011 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Receives food stamps 0.267 -0.004 -0.000
(0.011) (0.009)
Receives welfare 0.057 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
Panel C: Income and Employment
Percent of federal poverty level 1.006 0.001 0.002
(0.019) (0.019)
Number of people working 1.294 0.012 0.019
(0.021) (0.017)
Additional controls x
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at
the 0.01 level. The data come from the 2000 to 2014 CEX. The sample contains 30,752
observations from 14,024 families. Each cell is the coefficient on the number of people
in a family eligible for Medicaid from Equation (1). All regressions control for family-
type-year and family-type-state fixed effects. The second column of estimates for Panels
A and B also includes controls for family income as a percent of the FPL, the square
of family income as a percent of the FPL, an indicator for the head of the household
being male, indicators for the race/ethnicity of the head of the household, the number
of working adults in the family, the age of the head of the household, the annual state
unemployment rate, and the number of family members with high school degrees, with
some college, and with bachelors’ degrees. In Panel C, the additional controls are the
same but do not include income as percent of the FPL or the number of people in
the family working. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are shown in
parentheses below the estimates.
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